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Abstract 
 
This paper examines contrasting experiences of the United Kingdom in addressing high public debt 
to GDP ratios following major wars.  A clear message is that interest rate/growth rate differentials 
were more important than primary budget surpluses for the different outcomes.  The debt to GDP 
ratio fell very rapidly under financial repression following World War II but remained stubbornly high 
despite large budget surpluses with price deflation after World War I.  Implications for policymakers 
today are that averting price deflation is a high priority and that supply-side policies that raise 
growth could play an important part in debt reduction. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen a large increase in public debt to GDP ratios in those European countries 
which have borne the brunt of the financial crisis.  In some southern European countries these ratios 
are very high by historical standards while in the UK the ratio of gross government debt to GDP has 
doubled since 2007 (cf. Table 1).  Worries about fiscal sustainability have led to the adoption of new 
fiscal rules.  For Eurozone countries, a gross government debt ratio no greater than 60% is 
prescribed and the debt-convergence rules adopted in the light of the crisis indicate that 1/20th of 
the excess over this level shall be removed each year.   For the UK, the government has set a target 
that the cyclically-adjusted current budget should be in balance by the end of a 5-year rolling period 
and that public sector net debt as a ratio of GDP should be falling by 2015/16. 
The latest projection from the Office for Budget Responsibility sees it as quite likely that the UK will 
achieve these targets. Its central projection on ‘unchanged policies’ is for a reduction of about 20 
points in the ratio of public sector net debt to GDP over the next 20 years based on an average 
primary budget surplus of about 1.4 per cent of GDP after which the pressures of an ageing 
population would return the ratio to its current level by the late 2050s (OBR, 2014).  However, OECD 
(2013) calculates that to stay within Eurozone rules for every year from 2014 to 2023, Greece will 
have to maintain a primary budget surplus of about 9% of GDP, Italy and Portugal about 6% of GDP, 
and Ireland and Spain about 3.5% of GDP.  Dealing with the debt legacy of the crisis in this way will 
clearly be much more painful.  But even the British path of debt reduction could be considerably 
more difficult than OBR suggests if pressures to increase public spending prove irresistible and/or 
the future path of interest rates and economic growth is less favourable than is currently projected. 
It is, of course, the case that the UK has successfully dealt with public debt ratios well above 
anything seen in Table 1 in the past which might seem to suggest that today’s European countries 
can repeat the trick.  Indeed, optimistic assessments of the UK’s ability to deal with its inflated public 
debt ratio often emphasize that similar (indeed much more serious) problems have been easily 
resolved in the past (Neild, 2012).  Whilst this could perhaps be claimed for the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic Wars and World War II, the experience after World War I was much more difficult.  
Moreover, all of these episodes took place in quite different circumstances from those likely to 
prevail in the near future.  This suggests that in seeking lessons from history it is worthwhile to 
review the details of past UK policies and achievements in dealing with high public debt ratios.  This 
is the task undertaken by this paper. 
In particular, the following questions are addressed: 
1) On an ex-post accounting basis, how did the UK cut the public debt to GDP ratio after the 
three major wars of the last 200 years? 
2) What was the political basis for running primary budget surpluses in each of these periods? 
3) What are the lessons from major reductions in the UK public debt to GDP ratio for today’s 
policymakers in the UK and in the Eurozone? 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The arithmetic of debt reduction is briefly reviewed in Section 2.  
Section 3 analyzes the historical experience of debt reduction in the UK. Section 4 explores 
implications for today’s policymakers and section 5 concludes. 
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2) The Basics of Reducing Public Debt Ratios 
It is well-known that the steady-state condition for the public debt to GDP ratio to be stabilized, such 
that Δd = -b + (i – π – g)d = 0, is 
b* = d(i - π – g)  =  id – d(π + g)                                                                                                                        (1) 
where b* is the required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, d is the public debt to GDP ratio, i is 
the nominal interest rate on government debt, π is the rate of inflation and g is the growth rate of 
real GDP.  The required primary budget surplus increases with the debt to GDP ratio and with the 
excess of the real interest rate on government debt minus the growth rate of real GDP (r – g) and 
likewise the b required for any given rate of reduction in d.  A balanced budget rule requires that b = 
id, so this will deliver b > b* when (π + g) > 0.  In ‘normal’ circumstances with inflation and growth, 
this condition will be met.  In conditions of price deflation or recession, it may not be, and with both 
deflation and recession, it will not be met. 
Of course, if the real interest rate/growth rate differential is negative it is possible to stabilize the 
debt ratio while running a primary budget deficit.  However, conventional theories of economic 
growth suggest that it is reasonable to expect that r > g.  A Ramsey-model formulation with 
optimizing households will imply that in steady state r* = ρ + θg* where ρ is the rate of time of 
preference and θ is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to the growth of 
consumption.  Both ρ and θ are expected to be positive which implies r > g (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995, ch. 2).  That said, even if in the long run the real interest rate is determined by the 
fundamentals of productivity and thrift, in the short to medium term these forces may be 
subordinate to the impact of monetary and fiscal policies and there have been quite long periods 
where real interest rates have been below real growth rates in many countries, notably in the so-
called ‘Golden Age’ of European growth after World War II (Allsopp and Glyn, 1999). 
A policy of ‘financial repression’ can be defined as one in which government intervention reduces 
the nominal interest rate on public debt below the free market rate.  Combined with inflation, this 
will be conducive to a more favourable configuration of (r – g) and may well entail a negative real 
interest rate on government borrowing.1  The methods by which this may be achieved include the 
imposition of interest rate ceilings, balance-sheet regulation of the banking sector, control of central 
bank interest rate policies and restrictions on international capital mobility (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 
2015).  The general idea is to create captive domestic savings from which the government can 
benefit. 
This implies that there are several ways to address an incipiently unsustainable fiscal position 
including fiscal consolidation, manipulating the interest rate/growth rate differential, and reducing 
debt by restructuring or persuading creditors to give debt relief.  If an adequate fiscal response is not 
forthcoming, then resort must be made to one of these other means. 
In this context, it is useful to get a sense of how large reductions in d have been achieved in the past.  
A permutation on equation (1) gives the ex-post accounting formula employed by Abbas et al. (2011) 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that the ex-ante implication of financial repression on r is distinct from that of surprise 
inflation which is a different (possibly complementary) strategy for manipulating the ex-post real interest rate, 
cf. equation 6 in Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015). 
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dT – d0 = Σt=1
T [(r – g)t /(1 + π + g)t]dt -1  +  Σt=1
T-bt  + Σt=1
T sfat                                                           (2)                                                                           
This decomposes the change in d into a term which is the cumulative effect of the interest 
rate/growth rate differential, a term which is the cumulative primary deficit, and a cumulative 
residual stock-flow adjustment term, Σsfa, which will reflect valuation effects such as the impact of 
exchange-rate changes for debt issued in foreign currency, ‘below-the-line’ fiscal operations such as 
privatizations, and errors in the data. 
Table 2 displays results of a decomposition of large reductions in the public debt to GDP ratio in the 
past based on equation (2).  Two points stand out.  First, in cases where the reduction was from a 
high initial level of d (> 80 per cent) the growth rate/interest rate differential played a relatively 
important part.  Second, in most periods the lion’s share of the reductions in d was due to primary 
budget surpluses but a major exception to this was observed in the sample for reductions starting in 
the years from 1945 to 1970 when the interest rate/growth rate differential was much more 
important than budget surpluses. 
3) UK Experience in Dealing with Debt after 3 Major Wars 
This section reviews the contrasting UK experiences in attempting to reduce high public debt to GDP 
ratios in the nineteenth century after the Napoleonic Wars and in the twentieth century after the 
two World Wars.  I consider both the arithmetic and the political economy of debt reduction. 
a) 1831-1913 
Analysis of the post-Napoleonic-War period is undertaken from the point at which national accounts 
estimates become available on an annual basis in 1830.  At that point the public debt to GDP ratio 
was 1.593 from which level it fell steadily to below 0.6 by 1872 and to 0.247 by 1913.  Table 3 shows 
that, arithmetically, this was achieved by running persistent primary budget surpluses which were 
sustained at a high average of around 5 per cent of GDP during the 1830s and 1840s and then 
gradually reduced through the following decades.  Nevertheless, in every decade these surpluses 
were adequate to meet the fiscal sustainability condition since in the later decades the debt ratio 
was much lower.  The real interest rate/ real growth rate differential was positive on average over 
most of the period.  It was over 3 percentage points in the deflationary decades of the 1840s and the 
1880s but slightly negative in the relatively fast growth decade of the 1860s.  The real interest rate 
paid on government debt averaged 3.9 per cent and the average rate of growth of real GDP 
averaged 2.0 per cent per year. 
The public debt throughout this period comprised at least 95 per cent ‘funded debt’, that is to say 
debt on which the government had no obligation to repay the capital (BPP, 1914).  Borrowing was 
entirely in domestic currency.  The vast majority was marketable debt in the form of Consols which 
paid a nominal interest rate of 3 per cent prior to Goschen’s conversion in 1888 which reduced this 
first to 2.75 per cent and then to 2.5 percent from 1903.  Consols were attractive to the public at 
these interest rates because they were highly liquid in an era when surprise inflation was not seen as 
a significant risk (Clare, 1898; Wormell, 2000).   
The key feature of these years was a strong commitment to balancing the budget.  The actual budget 
surplus or deficit was less than 1 per cent of GDP in all but 6 years.  Deficits greater than 1 per cent 
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of GDP only occurred at the times of the Boer and Crimean Wars and with compensation for slave 
owners in the mid 1830s.  A new ‘Sinking Fund’ was introduced in 1875 which established a debt 
charge of £28 million per annum (about 2 per cent of GDP) to cover debt service and redeem a 
proportion of the debt.2  There were no periods of severe price deflation and in the era of modern 
economic growth that followed the industrial revolution following a balanced budget rule was good 
enough to deliver steady reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio.  The context of this adherence to 
balanced budgets was an ‘unwritten fiscal constitution’ which entailed a ‘rules-based’ approach to 
economic policymaking that constrained political discretion and also entailed a macroeconomic 
trilemma choice which prevailed throughout the period, namely, a fixed exchange rate (the gold 
standard) and internationally mobile capital (Middleton, 1996).  The primary duty of the Bank of 
England as an independent central bank was to maintain the gold parity of the pound sterling. 
To modern eyes, the priority given to balancing the budget and, even more so, the large primary 
budget surpluses of the second quarter of the nineteenth century seem quite surprising.  The 
political context was, however, very different at this time.  In particular, the electorate was very 
narrow before the Second Reform Act of 1867 (about 6 per cent of adults) or even before the Third 
Reform Act of 1883 (about 14 per cent) and it was only in the late nineteenth century that 
competition for working class votes began.  This implied that a very low priority was given to 
government social expenditure (Lindert, 2004) which even in 1913 only amounted to 4.7 per cent of 
GDP (Middleton, 1996).  In contrast, the rules-based approach to policy making and the discipline 
that it imposed on politicians, which would mean that Britain would be well placed to borrow in the 
next military emergency, had some appeal for the enfranchised property owning voters (Bordo and 
Kydland, 1995). 
b) 1921-1938 
A striking feature of this period is the continuing very high level of the public debt to GDP ratio which 
was above 1.4 throughout, reached almost 1.8 at its peak, and was virtually the same in 1938 as in 
1921.  Not only had public debt soared as a consequence of World War I but its composition had 
changed markedly.  Nearly 15 per cent was now in foreign currency while 10 per cent had a maturity 
of less than 1 year and perpetual debt accounted for less than 5 per cent in the early 1920s (Abbas 
et al., 2014).   
Equally remarkable is the continued very high level of primary budget surpluses which averaged 6.2 
per cent of GDP during 1921-38.  Until rearmament changed the fiscal picture after 1935, the 
primary budget surplus was never below 5 per cent and in seven years exceeded 7 per cent.  These 
data are reported in Table 4.  Despite continuing large primary surpluses the debt to GDP ratio rose 
sharply in the early 1920s and again in the early 1930s and fell only modestly in the late 1920s; the 
impact of these surpluses was generally outweighed by adverse interest rate/growth rate 
differentials.  Real interest rates were very high in the years characterized by price deflation.  
After the UK left the gold standard and moved to the era of ‘cheap money’, the fiscal arithmetic 
changed dramatically as prices stopped falling and the real interest rate fell steeply so that it was 
below the growth rate for several years.  The debt to GDP ratio between 1933 and 1938 fell steadily 
with positive contributions both from primary budget surpluses (about 2/3) and from interest 
                                                          
2
 This was subsequently varied on several occasions and by 1899-1900 had been reduced to £23 million. 
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rate/growth rate differentials (about 1/3).  The fall in nominal interest rates permitted the 
conversion in 1932 of the War Loan from a 5% per cent bond redeemable between 1929 and 1947 
to a 3.5 per cent with no redemption date which could not be repaid until 20 years had elapsed.  
This reduced debt service by about £30 million per year and raised the proportion of private 
holdings repayable only by government option from 19 to 45 per cent while a further 15 per cent 
had a maturity of over 15 years (Howson, 1975). 
The early 1920s saw an attempt to return to the pre-war rules of the balanced budget and the gold 
standard but this did not deliver the nineteenth century result.  Balanced budget orthodoxy 
remained very strong as is demonstrated by the over-riding of the automatic stabilizers in the face of 
the downturn resulting from the world depression in the early 1930s such that there was an overall 
surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP in 1933.  Although the budget was close to balance in most years, in 
the face of price deflation and several years when real GDP fell sharply, this was not enough to 
reduce the public debt to GDP ratio over the period as a whole.  Returning to gold made debt 
reduction much harder.  In the early 1920s, the debt problem was seriously exacerbated by the large 
fall in prices necessitated by the decision to return to gold at the pre-war parity which required 
prices to fall significantly to restore international competitiveness and severe deflationary pressures 
were renewed at the end of the decade through gold hoarding by surplus countries (Irwin, 2010). 
A long period of big primary budget surpluses which more or less balanced the budget in the face of 
high levels of debt service was achieved even though the franchise was extended to about 75 per 
cent of adults in 1918 and to 95 per cent by the time of the 1929 election which was conducive to 
strong growth in public expenditure for social purposes (education, health, housing, transfers) which 
rose from 4.7 per cent of GDP on the eve of World War I to 7.2 per cent in 1925 and 8.7 per cent by 
1938 (Middleton, 1996).  This seems to reflect a substantial ‘displacement effect’, namely, that the 
experience of war finance seemed permanently to raise the maximum tolerable taxation level, which 
was first identified by Peacock and Wiseman (1961) and has been confirmed by modern econometric 
analysis (Henry and Olekalns, 2010).3   
Although the problem of the war debt was a major issue in the 1920s, the Labour Party’s proposal of 
a capital levy was rejected.  When Labour formed a minority government for the first time following 
the 1923 general election the controversial matter was referred in March 1924 to a committee of 
enquiry chaired by Lord Colwyn which eventually published its report in February 1927 (BPP, 1927).  
Its majority report was against a capital levy and the proposal was dropped.  The maximum yield of 
such a levy was estimated at £3 billion (equal to about 40 per cent of the stock of national debt 
which would have reduced b from 1.6 to 1.0).  The impact on the fiscal arithmetic was seen as 
relatively modest compared with the potential damage to the legitimacy of the taxation system and 
the adverse effects on the incentive to save.  The net improvement in the annual budgetary position 
was put at only about £60 million based on interest savings of £150 million offset by reduction in 
other tax receipt of £90 million.   
c) 1950-1970 
The outstanding feature of the 1950s and 1960s is the very rapid reduction of the public debt to GDP 
ratio.  From almost 200 per cent of GDP in 1950 it was below the Maastricht limit by 1971 when it 
                                                          
3
 Peacock and Wiseman suggested that the displacement effect was about 14 per cent of GDP. 
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had fallen to 58.3 per cent of GDP.  These two decades were characterized by primary budget 
surpluses in every year but one but the average was much smaller than during the inter war years at 
2.3 per cent of GDP compared with 6.2 per cent in 1921-38.  The average rate of inflation was about 
4 per cent per year and in eight years the ex-post real interest rate on government debt was 
negative.  Nominal interest rates were lower than at any time in the 1930s until 1958 and real 
interest rates were almost always below the real growth rate.  Growth was strong by British 
standards but, even so, the really noteworthy aspect of this period is the very low level of real 
interest rates; the average over the whole 20 years is only slightly positive.  Outlays on debt interest 
averaged only 4.5 per cent of GDP during the 1950s and 1960s compared with 6.6 per cent in the 
interwar period.  The fiscal sustainability data for this period are reported in Table 5. 
The rapid debt reduction of these years was achieved without many years of very painful fiscal 
consolidation which may explain why many British commentators do not think high public debt to 
GDP ratios matter.  This could be done because it was possible to address the issue through financial 
repression.   Allen (2014) provides a detailed account of the means by which this was achieved which 
included making banks have high levels of liquid assets to deposits which could be met by holding 
Treasury Bills, controls on interest rates, credit restrictions for private sector lending, and 
comprehensive foreign exchange controls.  In the 1950s, over 40 per cent of the public debt was 
held by domestic commercial banks and over 40 per cent was non-marketable (Abbas et al., 2014).   
The financial repression index score calculated by Battilossi (2004) was as high as 73.1 in 1953-7 and 
still 63.1 in 1963-7. 4 Politically, financial repression fitted with an era of very high top marginal 
income tax rates in a rather egalitarian climate and a strong preference for tight regulation of the 
financial system following the banking crises of the interwar period. 
The context under the Bretton Woods system was also a different macroeconomic policy trilemma 
choice, namely, a fixed exchange rate, independent monetary policy, and obstacles to capital 
mobility as foreign exchange controls were maintained from World War II until 1979.  The UK had 
low scores both for central bank independence (Cukierman et al. 1992) and also for capital account 
openness (Quinn and Toyoda, 2008).  The evidence presented to the Radcliffe Committee (1959) 
underlined that the Chancellor not the Bank had responsibility for interest rate policy while debt 
management and controlling the interest costs of the national debt were central tasks for the Bank 
throughout these decades (Goodhart, 2012).  Interest rates were decoupled from those prevailing 
abroad (Obstfeld, 1993).  There was relatively little surprise inflation (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2015); 
nominal interest rates rose but, even so, were held down relative to inflation.  The average maturity 
of the debt became much shorter than before World War II with short term debt accounting for 
nearly 20 per cent of the stock in the 1950s and 1960s as those who held the (unredeemable) War 
Loan issued in 1932 saw its price fall steadily from par in 1948 to 40 by 1970 (Allen, 2012). 
After 1945, public expenditure as a share of GDP was much higher than between the wars.  Between 
1951 and 1964 it was typically around 38 per cent of GDP with social expenditure now amounting to 
as much as 17 per cent of GDP.  World War II once again saw a sizeable displacement effect (Henry 
and Olekalns, 2010) and the longer-term impact of the expanded electorate and the rise of the 
Labour Party was reflected in the Beveridge-era welfare state which was regarded as untouchable by 
                                                          
4
 The index has 3 equally-weighted components, namely, reserve requirements for banks, real deposit rates of 
banks and government liabilities held by the banking system.  Each of these is measured on a scale of 0 
(minimum) to 100 (maximum) standardized to a normal distribution. 
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the Conservatives when back in office (Middleton, 1996).  At the same time, the Conservatives had 
been elected in 1951 on the back of popular dissatisfaction with austerity and ‘you’ve never had it so 
good’ was to be the basis of future electioneering by them (Zweininger-Bargielowska, 1994).  In this 
context, they were constantly seeking ways within the political constraints of the postwar 
settlement to reduce taxes (Daunton, 2002).  By contrast, Labour wanted further expansion of social 
expenditure which did indeed rise sharply after they regained office in 1964.  Moreover, in this 
‘Keynesian era’, balanced budgets were no longer ‘mandatory’ and overall budget deficits averaged 
2.1 per cent of GDP (Middleton, 2010).  It seems clear that there was no longer any political 
possibility of running primary budget surpluses at the level of the 1920s.  In the absence of 
favourable interest rate/growth rate differentials, a sizeable reduction in the public debt to GDP 
ratio would have been most unlikely. 
Although the Labour Party won a landslide victory in the 1945 election, there was no attempt to 
introduce a capital levy.  The issue was dealt with by the National Debt Enquiry Committee in 1945 
whose members included Keynes and Meade who wrote the report which rejected the idea mainly 
because it would do even less to improve the fiscal arithmetic than in the 1920s given that ‘cheap 
money’ would continue to prevail, and rates of income and capital taxation were now much higher 
and highly progressive (Howson, 1988, ch. 15). 
d) Overview 
Table 6 provides a comparative decomposition of the changes in public debt to GDP ratios in these 
different periods.  This highlights how different was the experience after World War II from what 
had gone before.  In the 1950s and 1960s, well over half of the reduction in the debt to GDP ratio 
came from a favourable interest rate/growth rate differential in conditions of financial repression 
and rapid growth.  Before World War I, primary budget surpluses did all the work and (r – g) offset a 
good part of their impact.  In the difficult deflationary conditions of the 1920s and early 1930s, very 
substantial primary budget surpluses were more than offset by very unfavourable interest rate/ 
growth rate differentials.5  In turn, these contrasting episodes also underline the importance of the 
exchange rate regime or more generally the macroeconomic trilemma policy choice in facilitating or 
obstructing debt ratio reduction. 
Table 7 reports some details of the composition of the UK public debt in different periods which 
helps to establish the context for the financial repression of the decades after World War II.  
Compared with the years before World War I, it is clear that the proportion of marketable debt was 
much lower.  The high share of public debt held by the banks in the 1950s also stands out.  This was 
a configuration which gave the government considerable scope to distort interest rates to its 
advantage. 
British economic history demonstrates that it has been possible to run much larger sustained 
primary budget surpluses even in an economy with a broad electorate than recent OECD experience 
seems to suggest.6  However, the circumstances in which that was possible (balanced budget rule 
                                                          
5
 The relatively large residual adjustment term for the years 1921 to 1938 reflects in considerable part the 
importance of debt in foreign currency and the higher exchange rate in the late 1930s compared with the early 
1920s. 
6
 IMF (2013a) reported that the maximum annual average primary budget surplus over a 10-year period in an 
advanced economy since 1950 is only about 3 per cent of GDP. 
8 
 
plus big displacement effect) are not easy to repeat and they had already disappeared by the 1950s 
when the displacement effect of World War II went to increase the size of the welfare state.  As 
Keynes (1927) forcefully pointed out in his evaluation of the report of the Colwyn Committee, 
running large primary budget surpluses to pay off the national debt was not realistic when there 
were so many more voter-friendly uses for the tax revenues. 
The rejection of proposals for a capital levy after each of the World Wars can be as epitomizing the 
general impracticality of imposing a welfare-improving capital levy that would reduce the 
deadweight burden of the debt without undermining saving (Eichengreen, 1990).  In a democracy, 
the imposition would only come after protracted argument and delay and probably substantial 
capital flight.  This would make a capital levy ineffectual even in the unlikely event that reputational 
effects or a credible commitment technology were able to address the time-inconsistency problem. 
4) Lessons for Post-Crisis Policy 
This section considers current approaches to debt reduction in the UK and the Eurozone in the light 
of earlier British experience in tackling large public debt to GDP ratios.  The environment differs in 
that debt reduction will be attempted in the context of the fiscal pressures resulting from population 
ageing, European single market rules preclude capital controls, and balanced budget orthodoxy no 
longer holds sway.  Nevertheless, some useful lessons are available. 
a) Future UK Public Debt/GDP Reduction 
OBR (2014) projects future debt to GDP ratios in terms of public sector net debt on the basis of 
‘unchanged policies’ and assumptions about key economic variables.  In all projections a steady state 
is assumed in which g = 2.4 per cent per year (based on labour productivity growth of 2.2 per cent 
and employment growth of 0.2 per cent) and (r – g) = 0.4 (based on a nominal interest rate of 5 per 
cent and inflation at 2.2 per cent).  The primary budget surplus averages about 1 per cent of GDP 
over the period 2013/14 through 2032/33 with a peak level of 3 per cent in 2018/19 gradually falling 
to 0.7 per cent by 2032/33.  As Table 8 reports, this delivers a central projection that public sector 
net debt will be 54 per cent of GDP in 2032/33.  This rate of debt to GDP reduction is quite modest 
by 1950s standards but requires primary budget surpluses which are more than double the average 
of the 20 years before the crisis.  OBR also projects the implications of smaller and larger budget 
surpluses and note that returning the debt ratio to 40 per cent by 2032/33 would require the 
primary budget surplus to average about 2 per cent of GDP. 
From an historical perspective, the assumption of a small positive number for (r – g) catches the eye.  
As section 3 showed, the interest rate/growth rate differential not only matters a lot for the 
outcome of a fiscal consolidation process aimed at reducing the debt to GDP ratio but it has also 
exhibited a great deal of variation, at least for periods as short as 20 years.  Table 8 reports 
illustrative calculations with (r – g) at +2.0 per cent from 2018/19, the average for the half-century 
before World War I, and at -2.7 per cent, the average for the 1950s and 1960s.  In the former case, 
the projected fiscal strategy delivers only a small reduction in the debt to GDP ratio from 74 to 65 
per cent whereas in the latter case there is a large reduction to 27 per cent. 
In the absence of the framework which sustained financial repression in the early post-war decades 
(capital controls, a highly regulated banking system, and a far from independent central bank), it is 
9 
 
not likely that a large negative interest rate/growth rate differential can be contrived by UK 
policymakers.7  A more salient aspect of this arithmetic is that supply-side policy is a key ingredient 
for the reduction of debt to GDP because of the importance of sustaining real GDP growth given the 
level of real interest rates.  Effectively addressing well-known deficiencies in such areas as human 
capital, infrastructure, regulation and taxation (Crafts, 2013) would reduce the need for further 
austerity to bring the debt to GDP ratio down. 
Recent UK productivity performance strongly reinforces the importance of addressing weaknesses in 
supply-side policy since it raises the possibility that OBR’s assumption of 2.2 per cent per year labour 
productivity growth may be quite optimistic.  A ‘productivity puzzle’ exists in that real GDP per hour 
worked at the end of 2013 was about 16 per cent below what would have been expected on the 
basis of its pre-crisis trend and a significant part of this shortfall is unexplained (Barnett et al., 2014).  
It is generally agreed that financial crises have a permanent levels effect on output.  This may have 
been substantial in the UK; according to Ollivaud and Turner (2014) there has been a fall of 9.1 per 
cent in the level of potential labour productivity.  At the same time, it is quite possible that trend 
growth has also been adversely affected, as is suggested by some analyses based on time-series 
econometrics.  For example, Antolin-Diaz et al. (2014) estimate that trend labour productivity 
growth has fallen to about 1 per cent per year.  OBR may well have to revisit its debt sustainability 
projections since its assumption about future trend growth appears increasingly questionable and 
long-run reduction of the public debt ratio may be more difficult than it currently allows. 
b) Dealing with Eurozone Debt Problems 
Table 1 reported that several Eurozone economies currently have very high public debt to GDP ratios 
and, as noted above, obeying the new fiscal rules is projected by OECD to require large primary 
budget surpluses over extended periods of time.  The required surpluses depend, of course, not only 
on the public debt to GDP ratio but also on future real interest rates and growth rates which are 
projected by OECD (2014) to make debt reduction quite demanding (cf. Table 9).  If the ECB fails to 
prevent a period of price deflation in the Eurozone, real interest rates are all the more likely to 
exceed real growth rates.  As with British participation in the gold standard in the interwar years, the 
constraints of Eurozone membership make the fiscal arithmetic all the more difficult.  This raises the 
question as to how likely it is that the troubled Eurozone economies will actually comply with the 
fiscal rules.   
In these circumstances, financial repression has obvious attractions as the British experience after 
World War II highlights.  However, this is not the 1950s and adopting such policies nowadays is far 
more difficult, especially because of the much greater degree of European economic integration.  
That said, it is reasonable to expect some moves toward financial repression.  Although EU rules 
guarantee free movement of capital and the independence of the European Central Bank, countries 
largely retain sovereignty over fiscal and financial matters and that gives them some scope for 
financial repression (van Riet, 2013).  Even at the European level, Basel III rules for capital adequacy 
of banks will privilege government bonds as zero risk and EU law allows for capital controls in 
exceptional circumstances.  Governments under financial stress could be granted increased leeway 
                                                          
7
 Although the very low long-term interest rates that have prevailed with unconventional monetary policy have 
offered scope, as in the 1930s, to lock in lower real interest rates as recent issues of long-maturity bonds with 
low yields have underlined. 
10 
 
to introduce national regulatory actions and moral suasion in support of government debt 
financing.8 
In the absence of a major return to financial repression, it is quite possible that the maximum 
politically feasible budget surplus may be too small to meet the Eurozone’s fiscal rules (Buiter and 
Rahbari, 2013).  The data in Table 9 inform this judgement.  The highest primary budget surpluses 
sustained over a 5-year period since 1980 are below what will be required according to OECD 
(2013a) in each of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.  Moreover, in the first three of these countries, 
the ‘fiscal limit’ may already have been reached in the sense that estimated fiscal reaction functions 
suggest that the primary balance will not be improved sufficiently to maintain fiscal sustainability 
(Ghosh et al., 2013). 
The economics literature does not have a good answer as to what the maximum politically feasible 
primary budget surplus may be.  Eichengreen and Panizza (2014) conclude that the very few cases 
where countries have recently achieved the persistent surpluses needed by these Eurozone 
economies are so politically and economically idiosyncratic that they provide no guidance.  The UK 
did run such surpluses in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and in the interwar period 
but this seems to be an outcome of a strong adherence to balanced budget rules which is completely 
foreign to any of the five countries in Table 9 (Wyplosz, 2012). 
There seems still to be scope to increase tax revenues in all the countries which have a potential 
debt problem.  Thus, recent Laffer-Curve estimates suggest that Southern European countries 
typically have scope to raise revenues from consumption taxes by at least 20 per cent of GDP 
(Trabandt and Uhlig, 2012).  Stochastic frontier analysis has found that ‘tax effort’ levels are around 
70 per cent with the implication that, if potential were achieved, tax revenues would rise by at least 
10 per cent of GDP (IMF 2013a).9  The issue is not the economic but rather the political feasibility of 
increasing the ratio of tax revenues to GDP.  Even if tax burdens are increased, it is apparent that 
there are significant pressures to increase expenditure on the welfare state.   
The huge rise of social transfers as a percentage of GDP during the 20th century was driven by the 
spread of democracy, the desire for safety nets in the face of major economic crises, and population 
ageing (Lindert, 2004).  These forces remain powerful and European countries face demographic 
pressures that, in the absence of policy reforms, will push social expenditures appreciably higher 
over the next 20 years.  In these circumstances, it is hard to believe that prioritizing the use of 
additional tax revenues to fund reductions in the stock of public debt will be politically appealing.  
This is also the message from British economic history.  After the interwar depression in an age of 
mass democracy, the ideas of Beveridge and Keynes ruled the roost in post-war Britain; for both 
Conservative and Labour governments financing a much expanded welfare state had priority over 
balancing the budget and paying off the national debt. 
In sum, it is quite likely that the primary budget surpluses entailed by the fiscal compact exceed the 
politically feasible maxima in which case something will have to give!  So it is perhaps not surprising 
that the idea of a capital levy has resurfaced in Europe.  Piketty sees an exceptional tax on private 
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 Van Riet (2013) itemizes measures already undertaken that epitomize financial repression, especially in 
distressed Eurozone economies, and discusses the financially repressive implications of new prudential 
regulations and protective measures against market turmoil.   
9
 ‘Tax effort’ is defined as the ratio of actual tax collection to potential tax revenue. 
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capital as ‘the most just and efficient solution’ to the public debt problem (2014, p. 541) and Bach et 
al. (2014) offer detailed proposals for just such a not-to-be-repeated tax in Germany.  Also 
unsurprisingly, such proposals have been met with fierce criticism that they will have adverse effects 
on savings and investment, will be hard to implement without provoking capital flight and will call 
into question the credibility of tax rules more generally (Keen, 2013), arguments that the Colwyn 
Committee also recognized.  Nevertheless, the main reason such proposal were twice rejected in 
Britain was that the net budgetary gain was not worth these risks, a point which perhaps deserves 
more emphasis today. 
A more promising unorthodox solution might be debt restructuring even though the political 
constraints on such a course of action are quite severe.  Thus, it is presumably unacceptable for the 
process to involve inter-country transfers, or to penalize bondholders including especially banks, or 
to involve monetization of the debt and inflation.  It may be possible to devise a scheme which 
meets these constraints as in the proposal made by Paris and Wyplosz (2014).  This entails purchases 
of sovereign debt by the ECB which would swap them into zero-interest perpetuities and would 
eventually be repaid by retaining future seigniorage revenues that would otherwise accrue to the 
sovereign debtor. 
5) Conclusions 
Attempts in the past by the UK to address the issue of high public debt to GDP ratios which were the 
legacy of major wars produced strongly contrasting experiences.  After the Napoleonic Wars, the 
debt to GDP ratio was steadily reduced over a long period by running primary budget surpluses 
which were underpinned by a strong commitment to the balanced budget rule.  After World War II, 
the debt to GDP ratio was reduced very rapidly as primary budget surpluses were strongly 
augmented by policies of financial repression which held the real interest rate below the real growth 
rate.  In the interwar period, price deflation in the context of policies to return to the gold standard 
meant that large and persistent primary budget surpluses were undermined by unfavourable 
interest rate/ growth rate differentials.  Given the demise of the balanced budget rule and the 
advent of the welfare state, it seems quite unlikely that the primary surpluses of the 1830s or even 
the 1920s could be repeated in Europe today. 
These contrasting histories underline the importance of (r – g), the real interest rate on government 
debt minus the growth rate of real GDP, to the success of debt reduction strategies, a point that 
seems often to be neglected in current policy thinking.  Three important points follow from this.  
First, it is extremely important that central banks prevent price deflation which pushes real interest 
rates up especially when the lower bound for nominal rates is reached.  Second, financial repression 
policies, which hold down real interest rates on government debt, have strong political appeal when 
public debt ratios are high because they offer an alternative to severe austerity.  Third, in the face of 
continuing weak productivity performance and limited scope to exploit financial repression 
nowadays, reforms of supply-side policies with a view to raising real GDP growth are potentially 
valuable complements to budget stringency in a debt reduction strategy. 
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Table 1.  General Government Gross Debt (%GDP) 
 2007 2014 
Austria   64.8   86.8 
Belgium   86.9 105.6 
Denmark   27.3   42.6 
Finland   33.9   59.6 
France   64.2   95.1 
Germany   63.5   73.1 
Greece 102.8 177.2 
Ireland   24.0 109.5 
Italy   99.7 132.1 
Netherlands   42.5   68.3 
Norway   49.6   30.1 
Portugal   68.4 130.2 
Spain   35.5   97.7 
Sweden   38.1   41.5 
Switzerland   53.3   46.1 
United Kingdom   43.6   89.5 
 
Source: IMF (2015). 
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Table 2.  Average Decomposition of Large Public Debt Ratio Reductions (% GDP) 
 
 
 
Start  
Initial 
Ratio 
Final 
Ratio 
Decrease Budget 
Surplus 
Component 
Growth-
Interest 
Differential 
Component 
Residual 
Adjustment 
Pre-1914   88.9 62.3 26.6 18.5   9.3   -1.2 
Between 1914-44 121.7 87.7 34.0 23.1 12.0   -1.0 
Between 1945-70   92.3 32.7 59.6 20.7 53.2 -14.2 
Post-1970   73.6 46.3 27.3 22.7   0.8     3.8 
Ratio > 80 136.7 79.6 57.1 29.0 37.4   -9.3 
Ratio < 80   55.2 33.9 21.3 15.1   4.3     1.9 
 
Notes: the samples are drawn from an unbalanced panel with start dates somewhere in the intervals 
shown; examples do not include cases where default occurred. 
Source:  Abbas et al. (2011). 
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Table 3.  Fiscal Sustainability Data, 1831-1913 
 b i π g d b* 
1831-40 5.23 3.68   -0.85 2.26 1.487 3.60 
1841-50 4.97 3.68   -1.04 1.66 1.350 4.36 
1851-60 3.52 3.58 1.23 2.25 1.071 0.06 
1861-70 2.50 3.36 0.48 3.03 0.769    -0.12 
1871-80 2.13 3.72 0.16 1.95 0.568 1.06 
1881-90 2.08 4.08   -0.62 1.30 0.490 1.72 
1891-1900 1.50 3.92 0.63 2.16 0.372 0.50 
1901-13 1.34 5.39 0.48 1.68 0.313 1.02 
 
Note:  
b* is the required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio to satisfy the condition that b = (i - π – g)d. 
Sources: b, primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, i, average nominal interest rate on government 
debt, d, public debt to GDP ratio, π, rate of inflation based on GDP deflator, g real GDP growth rate 
are all from Mitchell (1988).  
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Table 4.  Fiscal Sustainability Data, UK 1921-1938 
 b i π g d b* 
1921 5.10 4.41 -10.52 -4.71 1.472 28.92 
1922 7.38 4.45 -16.05 4.11 1.668 27.34 
1923 8.92 4.52 -8.01 3.40 1.763 16.10 
1924 7.60 4.58 -1.39 5.10 1.726 1.50 
1925 6.46 4.59 0.27 2.89 1.633 2.34 
1926 6.10 4.85 -1.41 -4.59 1.717 18.63 
1927 6.89 4.57 -2.36 8.22 1.635 -2.11 
1928 7.53 4.75 -1.12 1.17 1.613 7.58 
1929 7.00 4.85 -0.34 3.43 1.584 2.79 
1930 6.15 4.75 -0.40 -3.72 1.592 14.12 
1931 5.41 4.51 -2.40 -2.37 1.698 15.76 
1932 7.25 4.49 -3.58 0.65 1.736 12.88 
1933 7.42 3.90 -1.40 4.74 1.792 1.00 
1934 6.76 3.58 -0.68 4.78 1.731 -0.90 
1935 5.68 3.64 0.87 4.26 1.650 -2.46 
1936 4.95 3.59 0.55 4.15 1.587 -1.76 
1937 3.89 3.67 3.73 3.17 1.472 -4.75 
1938 1.56 3.62 2.77 0.42 1.438 0.62 
       
1925-29 average 6.78 4.72 -0.99 2.22 1.636 5.71 
1933-38 average 5.04 3.67 1.67 3.59 1.612 -1.38 
 
Note: 
b* is the required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio to satisfy the condition that b = (i – π – g)d. 
Sources: 
b, primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, i, average nominal interest rate on government debt, and d, 
public debt to GDP ratio from Middleton (2010) database; π, rate of inflation based on GDP deflator 
from Feinstein (1972); g, 4th quarter real GDP growth rate, from Mitchell et al. (2012).  
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Table 5.  Fiscal Sustainability Data, UK 1950-1970 
 b i π g d b* 
1950 6.64 2.43 0.65 3.24 1.995 -2.91 
1951 4.98 2.63 7.40 3.62 1.798 -15.09 
1952 2.22 2.91 9.03 -0.16 1.656 -9.87 
1953 0.26 3.09 3.02 4.62 1.547 -7.04 
1954 1.96 3.08 2.06 3.80 1.497 -4.16 
1955 2.28 3.37 3.64 3.64 1.410 -5.51 
1956 1.51 3.43 6.28 1.60 1.309 -5.83 
1957 1.56 3.52 4.03 1.91 1.236 -2.99 
1958 2.54 3.84 4.53 0.29 1.197 -1.17 
1959 1.94 3.92 1.58 4.12 1.142 -2.03 
1960 1.48 4.25 1.72 4.93 1.089 -2.61 
1961 1.63 4.45 3.16 4.09 1.049 -2.94 
1962 2.87 4.49 3.44 2.13 1.006 -1.09 
1963 1.61 4.34 1.94 3.48 0.986 -1.06 
1964 1.09 4.53 1.98 6.32 0.920 -3.47 
1965 1.47 4.83 3.67 2.53 0.863 -1.18 
1966 0.94 4.96 5.13 1.92 0.825 -1.72 
1967 -0.39 5.35 2.44 2.78 0.797 0.10 
1968 1.19 5.58 3.57 4.15 0.786 -1.68 
1969 4.74 6.03 5.75 1.30 0.729 -0.74 
1970 6.46 6.48 7.61 2.27 0.647 -2.20 
       
1950-59 2.59 3.22 4.22 2.67 1.479 -5.66 
1960-70 2.10 5.03 3.67 3.26 0.882 -1.69 
 
Note: 
b* is the required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio to satisfy the condition that b = (i – π – g)d. 
Sources: 
b, primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, i, average nominal interest rate on government debt, and P, 
public debt to GDP ratio from Middleton (2010) database; π, rate of inflation based on GDP deflator, 
and g, real GDP growth rate, from Feinstein (1972). 
  
20 
 
Table 6.  Decomposition of Changes in UK Public Debt Ratio as %GDP 
 Initial Ratio Final Ratio Decrease Budget 
Surplus 
Component 
Growth-
Interest 
Differential 
Component 
Residual 
Adjustment 
1831-54 157.9 103.9 54.0 120.2 (88.6) 22.4 
1855-75 101.8 54.7 47.1 53.1 (11.9) 5.9 
1876-1913 56.5 24.7 31.8 58.8 (42.7) 15.7 
1921-38 147.2 143.8 3.4 112.1 (137.1) 28.4 
1950-70 199.5   64.7 134.8 48.9 72.7 13.2 
 
Source: derived from Tables 3, 4 and 5 using equation (2). 
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Table 7. Characteristics of UK Public Debt 
a) Maturity, Currency and Marketability 
 < 1 year in £ ≥ 1 year in £ Foreign Currency Non-Marketable 
1900-13   2.4 97.6   0.0 15.0 
1921-32 10.1 75.5 14.4 19.3 
1933-38 10.0 77.0 13.0 19.8 
1950-59 18.9 73.0   8.0 41.9 
1960-70 16.7 76.9   6.4 25.6 
 
b) Ownership 
 Non-Bank 
Domestic 
Domestic 
Commercial 
Banks 
Central Banks Non-Resident 
1900-13 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1921-32 69.2 19.8   5.7   5.3 
1933-38 61.9 26.0   5.0   7.1 
1950-59 34.8 37.7 12.2 15.3 
1960-70 53.5 12.7 19.9 13.9 
 
Note: ‘non-marketable debt’ includes debt held by the National Debt Commissioners some of which 
comprised terminable annuities, ways and means advances, National Savings securities, Tax Reserve 
Certificates, interest-free loans from international organizations, and loans from overseas 
governments. 
Source: database for Abbas et al. (2014)
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Table 8.  UK Public Sector Net Debt/GDP in 2032/33 (%) 
OBR Central Projection 54 
b:  + 1 ppt 40 
b:   -1  ppt 68 
r – g:  +2.0 per cent 65 
r – g :  -2.7 per cent 27 
 
Sources: OBR (2014) first 3 rows, own calculations last 2 rows. 
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Table 9. Aspects of Future Fiscal Sustainability 
 2014 d 2020 r 2030 r 2014-30 g Max b Limit of d 
Greece 1.772 6.9 3.2 2.2 3.9 <1.586 
Ireland 1.095 3.1 1.8 2.3 5.4 1.497 
Italy 1.321 3.1 2.3 1.5 5.3 <1.247 
Portugal 1.302 5.4 2.4 1.4 2.4 <0.984 
Spain 0.977 4.2 2.0 1.5 2.9 1.539 
 
Sources:  
2013 d is public debt to GDP ratio in 2013 (IMF, 2015). 
2020 r and 2030 r are projected real interest rates on 10-year government bonds in 2020 and 2030, 
respectively (OECD, 2014). 
2014-30 g is the projected average rate of growth of real GDP between 2014 and 2030 (OECD, 2014). 
Max b is the largest average primary budget surplus as a percentage of GDP over a 5-year period 
since 1980 (IMF, 2013b). 
Limit of d is the projected public debt to GDP ratio at which past experience indicates that the 
response of the primary surplus would no longer satisfy a fiscal-sustainability criterion (Ghosh et al., 
2013). 
 
